The study of industrial organization is based on the premise that a fi rm´s behavior and performance are strongly dependent on its operating context, or more precisely on its industrial sett ings. Historically, the issue that received the most att ention has been industry structure, defi ned as industry concentration and measured by the "m-fi rm seller concentration ratio and the Herfi ndal index" (Martin, 1988, 7). However, towards more recent times, industry features have been described by more and more att ributes. On the one hand, more complex behavioral processes, such as innovation and marketing eff orts, representing the aspects of an individual fi rm´s strategic behavior, have
been added into the picture. On the other, an emphasis has been placed on the collective forces dominantly outside the infl uence of single fi rms; those would be called situational factors, representing the infl uence of the policy and regulation, the rate of technological development, cross-industry infl uences, economic trends (eff ecting aggregate demand or aggregate investments) and so forth.
In this paper, we try to look at both sides: businesses´ strategic behavior and broader environmental circumstances. However, due to our limited resources, we have reduced the model complexity by concentrating on the three specifi c fi rm-level descriptors (technology, the size and fi nancial performance) and one industrylevel indicator, which is here used as a composite industry descriptor (Figure 1 ).
Figure 1 The Conceptual Model

Source: Authors
The business model performs the function of the focal point in which both individual (the fi rm´s) and industry-wide infl uences are refl ected.
The paper is structured as follows: After the Introduction, the two business models are defi ned and their main features are described (the fi rst characterized mainly by ownership control and the second being seen as a model depending on contractual relations and incentive alignments). Next, some statistics on the general trends in both industries are provided, after which our observations made of the fi rms in our sample are presented. Finally, the research results and the limitations are given. The paper ends with a discussion about our fi ndings.
UNDERLYING THEORY, BASIC CONCEPTS AND IDEAS
The conceptualizing and designing of business models had been the central issue in organization theory for more than a century. However, once the main challenges were no longer constricted to internal command mechanisms (the division of labor, building hierarchies and mapping process fl ows), the organizational design shifted att ention towards the business models whose architectures implied constructing a complex mechanism of network relationships with compatible business partners.
Economic approaches to organization theory mainly address the issues of hierarchical vs network (complex market) structures, using the notion of incomplete contracts present in transaction costs and agency theories. Practitioners often speak about these phenomena in terms of business growth patt erns, suggesting that there are the alternatives to organic growth that do not exclusively imply growth through M & As. Consequently, from the 1990s onwards, att ention has been drawn to the business models conceptualized as long-term contractual relationships.
The empirical evidence for the performance of the distinct types of business models is still building up. One of the questions we would like to raise is how these, presumably new, business models fare in the recent recession times.
As noted by M. G. Colombo and M. Delmastro (2008) , over the past three decades, researchers have been interested in various features of organizational design; however, the employment of diff erent research tools and a broad range of perspectives, "as diverse as management, organization science, industrial economics, business history, personnel economics, and sociology", has made this literature very fragmented.
Similarly, the term "business model" may have many applications. Borrowing a little from several approaches, we define a business model as a specific formal organizational arrangement establishing the lines of coordination and the spread of resources and activities.
In the strategic management literature, it could indicate a bundle of activities and resources providing for a competitive advantage (a business model designates the vertical and the horizontal spreads of technologically and/or market related businesses). In the transaction costs approach, it would designate a governance mechanism (whether a market, a contract or an administrative hierarchy is used for gett ing access to specifi c resources/inputs). In the transaction costs´ perspective, technologically induced savings are present due to scale economies; but in addition, transaction costs, as the costs of depending on markets to acquire the needed inputs, are also taken into consideration. So, the motives for establishing the boundaries of a fi rm will be dependent on both technical and market factors. In other words, the "measure" of the size of the fi rm would be represented by the number of transactions internalized in it, as suggested by R. Coase (1937) . Tying in with R. Coase´s ideas, O. E. Williamson (1975; 1985) specifi ed the criteria which make transactions suitable for internalization by developing the framework for the assessment of the individual cost-eff ectiveness of specifi c organizations. The agency approach would imply that it is primarily a mechanism for allocating residual control and lowering agency costs (the alternatives being the legal forms of business establishment, such as corporations as opposed to partnerships, and eventually capital structures/debt versus equity). The aforementioned descriptions are consistent with H. E. Aldrich´s (2008, 28) defi nition of the Organizational Forms made up of the specifi c confi gurations of goals, boundaries and activities, demonstrating their effi ciency through surviving, i.e. being selected by environmental criteria.
All of the above approaches bear an implication that there is a possibility of making a more or less deliberate choice among alternative models defi ned by theory. Second, approaches suggest the idea that based on the strategic considerations of a specifi c company one model is superior in its performance in comparison with an alternative model.
It is interesting to note that the historical perspective is very important in understanding what the dominant theory at any historical moment identifi es as organizational alternatives: be it mass-process production versus artisanal production; internal command chains and functional versus line hierarchies; unitary versus diversifi ed organizations, or be a legal/ institutional arrangement, where compact corporate forms are compared to more dissolved network arrangements. Also, once theory has specifi ed the "alternatives", practical business thinking at the fi rm level will often devise fi rm-specifi c business models by balancing the trade-off s of theoretical extremes. That is precisely why it is hard to empirically prove the economic dominance of one model against another.
Another important point is that choices are made at the fi rm level. Based on the idea of path dependency, a business model designates a fi rm-specifi c organizational arrangement that refl ects the past eff orts of strategic adjustment. The fi nancial success of a business model is a result of the interaction between the business model and its environment (Pfeff er & Salancik, 2003) . Furthermore, according to both, the Structure-Conduct-Performance (S-C-P) and its countering Chicago School Paradigm (Martin, 1988) , a fi nancial success may be expected to be mostly a result of the market structure and technology. A number of authors researching the link between organizational structures, or fi rm boundaries, depending on the underlying theoretical context, indicate that defi ning the relationship of the business model design is a permanent and pervasive research problem. (Aldrich & Herker, 1977; Galbreath & Galvin, 2008; Zott & Amit, 2010; Tran & Tian, 2013) . To conclude, as implied by H. Demsetz (1997, 41) , there is a connection between control, on the one hand, and wealth distribution and institutional design, on the other.
On the other hand, we suppose that fi rms operating under similar circumstances would be likely to develop similar business models. Were it the case, we could look for an industry specifi c business model evolving as a response to industry-specifi c factors. The particular historical confi guration of events and interpretations given to these events would allow us to construct a list of quantitative measures for a particular industry, in a certain location within a certain time frame. The next step is the establishing of a theory to explain the distinctions between the opposed business models. Infl uenced by M. Best´s (1990) explanation of the superiority of networks in the unstable business environment, we chose our two theoretical business models to be:
• the corporate model (the centralized hierarchical institution; control and allocation primarily by establishing ownership)
• the network model (legally independent companies working temporarily on joint projects; mutual controls established through contract relations).
The distinction is relevant and deserves an empirical proof.
That theoretical distinctions are always raised in order to stress the point should be taken into consideration; real-world diff erences may be less pronounced. In fact, "the corporate model" (i.e. the hierarchy) can also establish relatively stable ties with suppliers and distribution channels, as in the case of food and beverages manufacturing. Essentially, the main diff erence between the network model and the corporation model is that in the network model there is but one-term project activity. Each project participant invests and recovers his investments relatively autonomously; if potential partners, such as subcontractors, are available, partners in the project are not expected to worry too much for the future prospects of ex-partners. The corporate model will make decisions at the fi rm level and distribute investments according to the centralized logic of strategic growth, at least when it comes to "internal fractions" (business departments, subsidiaries and the like). Eventually, if the supplier and distributor markets are concentrated and hold-up is likely to occur, they will try to establish ownership controls over the problematic stage in the business chain.
So, if the role of smaller fi rms in relatively long-term patt erns of cooperation were to be specifi ed, then small fi rms would be those sacrifi ced in order to keep the large fi rm/partner stable. Consequently, the larger are more likely to survive. According to H. E. Aldrich (2008, 23) , the point is that larger fi rms often do not "…if ever, 'fail'" (in the sense of going out of business). Instead, if they disappear, it is for the reason of a takeover or a merger with another fi rm. The point is further explained by R. T. Averitt ´s (1968) concept of "center fi rms" (as opposed to "periphery fi rms"). According to him, "center fi rms" are those which exhibit market dominance, robust cash-fl ows and excellent credit and when their structure is concerned, they are diversifi ed; they have decentralized operations and serve a broad range of markets, including international.
"Through competition 'virtual organizations' -networked or transitory organizations where people come together temporarily to complete a task, then separate to pursue their individual specialties -are changing the structure of the traditionally, bureaucratic organization and contributing to its shrinkage" (Jensen, 2000, 27) .
At the beginning of this millennium, while introducing his elaboration of agency theory and its contribution to understanding organizational forms, M. C. Jensen (2000, 2) states that "Proof of the effi ciency of the corporate organizational form shows dramatically in market performance… The dominance of the corporate form of organization in large-scale, non-fi nancial activities indicates that it is winning in this competition. Yet, in spite of this relative success it is clear from the evidence of the last twentyfi ve years that the corporation has failed in many ways as an organizing device".
The corporate model would resemble hierarchies, as described by O. E. Williamson (1995, 228) , and the network model would be closer to a looser market model. O. E. Williamson also implies that it is worthy to compare the performance of distinct organization models by noting that:
"The ideal organization adapts quickly and effi caciously to disturbances of all kinds, but actual organizations experience trade-off s. Thus whereas more decentralized forms of organizations (e.g. markets) support high-powered incentives and display outstanding adaptive properties to disturbances of an autonomous kind, they are poorly suited in cooperative adaptation respects. Hierarchy, by contrast, has weaker incentives and is comparatively worse at autonomous adaptation but is comparatively bett er in cooperative adaptation respects".
The network would be a model of "multiorganizational aggregate" (Aldrich, 2008, 323) , a new organizational form with "loosely coupled, hierarchically diff erentiated relations, integrated by the actions of linking pin-organizations, and probably rather unstable" that could possibly demonstrate some superiority; he, however, also notes that the existing research into the topic is inconclusive and highly speculative. H. E. Aldrich (2008, 349) is pointing out the fact that researchers often speculate about the behavioral consequences of the interorganizational networks of the economic interest, whereas such a behavior still needs to be documented. We could also count on an explanation of the reason for the expected superiority of one model over the other.
The advantage of corporations over network arrangements is stronger, more reliable control. According to O. Hart (1995, 23-30) , "In reality, contracts are not comprehensive and are revised and renegotiated over time...As a result of contracting costs, the parties will write a contract that is incomplete. That is, the contract will contain gaps and missing provisions...ownership is a source of power when contracts are incomplete... that is, the owner of an asset has residual control rights over that asset to decide all usages of the asset in any way not inconsistent with the prior contracts".
On the other hand, M. Best (1990, 258-263) , however referring primarily to global corporations and global networks, even though the point made also concerns groups of smaller fi rms in industrial districts and supply chains on smaller-scale markets, points to the "limits to expansion by direct production and ownership", by corporations in establishing owned divisions and subsidiaries. He suggests that instead of the "Big Business" model, "networking in the form of international consortia, cross-licensing and jointventures agreements allows fi rms to share marketing, distribution, R&D, and even production facilities without investing directly...". While the advantages of large corporations are access to fi nancial resources, internalized support activities and strategic planning for joint development, the advantage of networks would be lower investments for a larger reach of activities and clearly fl exibility.
A period of crisis, from 2008 onwards, would therefore represent a perfect sett ing for demonstrating empirical evidence that networks do adapt faster, stand a bett er chance to survive and keep up performance even in times of hardship.
RESEARCH DESIGN AND FINDINGS
The empirical part of the paper is based on the examination of the performance of the two industries during the past decade. The last 10-15 years are an ideal scenario in which to observe the performance since it consists of a period of prosperity and expansion (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) and a period of instabilities and business contraction (after 2008).
We opted for conducting our research into the construction industry and the food manufacturing industry. Also, taking advantage of the fact that the world economy has recently been undergoing severe economic crises, we were interested in seeing whether particular business models are bett er adaptable than others, i.e. whether they are more capable of surviving, or at least stabilizing the business activity and keeping losses down during economic downturns.
In the research, various sources of data were used, including the panel data. In order to alleviate the interfering impact of the factors related to countryspecifi c conditions, our focus is on the companies pertaining to a single national economy (by doing so, we hope to eliminate the impact of macroeconomic conditions and government policies). The companies included in the research belong to the two industries: the food and beverage industry, on the one hand, and the construction and civil engineering industry, on the other. Both industries are characterized by distinguished national importance in terms of employment, value added and exports, but show diff erent growth models, and, as we expect, they will show diff erent capability in adapting to crisis.
We extracted data on a sample of 170 fi rms over a nineyear period, from 2005 to 2013, which are available in the Amadeus database (The Bureau van Dijk Database, BvD, 2010). The variables were chosen to refl ect a company's past strategic choices, as well as the infl uence of environmental circumstances.
Some Statistical Evidence for Industry Behavior and Performance During the Crisis
The period since 2008 has been the period of lowering the economic activity (Tables 1, 2 and 3) . The GDP fell sharply in 2009, and the economy has not recovered yet. Demand also fell, but domestic demand has been falling at a higher rate only in the past three years, while the largest drop in exports occurred in 2009, since when exports have been recovering. It is indicative that construction works have been falling continuously and ever more rapidly, whereas the production of consumer, non-durable products has had its ups and downs, but the drop has never been as sharp as in construction.
According to the indicators drawn by the Croatian Bureau of Statistics (CBS), the business activity level has started continuously slowing down after 2008. The drop was felt heavier in the construction industry than in the food and beverages industry. Table 3 The index of construction works, the manufacturing of food and beverages, seasonally adjusted
Source: Croatian Bureau of Statistics * The value of the construction works relates to June, the month that on average demonstrated the highest sectoral activity. Source: Authors, based on the data in the Amadeus database * All 91 companies in the construction industry in Croatia are included in the sample. However, for the sake of comparison, the indicators for all the construction companies, with the exception of the two largest companies in terms of assets are given in brackets (these two are the government-owned Croatian Highways and Croatian Roads and the value of the roads is accounted for in their portfolio). The value of approximately 16 trillion EUR accounts for almost 85% of all the assets and is therefore excluded from the calculation in brackets.
** The national companies operating roads and highways are also responsible for a sizeable loss. This is one of the supposed reasons for the actual government to try arranging for a concession agreement with potentially interested private sector investors.
was that, once the industry had been analyzed on a sample of larger fi rms (the statistical data reports on all fi rms employing 10 or more employees), a downturn in behavior (outlays), the activity level (the cash fl ow) and performance (operating revenues) were less pronounced. Table 5 summarizes the descriptive statistics on our sample of fi rms. As can be seen from A suggestive observation concerning the above sample, consistent with the theory that larger fi rms lower price elasticity of demand for food and beverages, as well as to the industry and fi rm-specifi c factors.
Cross-industry Variations According to the Panel Data Sample
In order to study the diff erences of the prospects of the industry sector, we extracted data for all Croatian companies in the food and beverages manufacturing industry and the construction industry, which makes a total of 80 and 91 companies, respectively. The data were extracted for the companies considered as large according to the Croatian standards, i.e. those employing 100 or more employees. The most interesting observation
It can be seen in Figure 3 that the operating revenues suff ered a more severe fall in construction, whereas the manufacturing of food and beverages showed almost no decline. It is also interesting that the fi ve largest construction fi rms (the government-operated roads and highroads excluded!) had a substantially In both industries, only one construction fi rm went out of business. Looking at the industry averages in Figure 1 (the sample fi rms only), in spite of the crisis, the average number of the employees in the selected industries remained almost the same in the 2005-2013 period. Still, by looking at the fi gures for the fi ve largest fi rms in both industries, the very largest fi rms by the number of employees were those with more pronounced layoff s.
Another set of observations concern changes in some basic indicators of business trends: the total assets and operating revenues. Figure 2 again is indicative of the fi gures for the fi ve largest companies (the size expressed in terms of the number of employees) for both industries, plus the sample average values.
higher decline in the operating revenues compared to the rest of the fi rms in the industry sample.Once again, it is indicative that the industry averages for the fi rms in the panel (contrary to the expectations, according to the statistical data on the volume of the activity, Tables  1 and 2 ) did not change throughout the period in spite of the crisis. We did not look into the individual performance of the smaller fi rms in the sample, but it will defi nitely be a challenge to gain an insight into whether their assets and revenues, and perhaps even employees themselves, have been shifting among fi rms.
SOME OBSERVATIONS OF THE INDUSTRY-SPECIFIC ORGANIZATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
The food and beverage industry 1 in Croatia is quite heterogeneous in its nature; companies range from small locally based processing firms to large multinational corporations with integrated value chains (from farms to wholesale and retail stores) or diversified into different industries; the ownership structure of those companies varies from state-to privately-owned companies, with few strategic owners or many small stockholders (both/either natural persons and/or legal entities). Even though a variety exists, the industry is highly concentrated, which implies that few large companies hold a large portion of market share. At the same time, the industry is also highly vertically coordinated and integrated through both ownership and contracts. Still, compared to construction, ownership is more pronounced.
Construction and civil engineering are considered to be highly networked industries, namely an industry requiring a high variety of tasks. Firms operating in this sector are engaged in numerous co-operations, strategic alliances and other types of networks. Most constructors off er a full service ranging from green fi eld to fi nalized turnkey projects. However, constructing a building consists of the work conducted by a variety of tasks requiring specialized (but not rare to fi nd) skills and technology. For instance, a typical construction building requires sett ing up electrical, plumbing and heating/cooling infrastructures, only to be followed by laying parquetry, ceramics, inside and outside doors and windows, fi nishing and painting and so forth. All those tasks are usually performed by specialists, and even though every building includes this kind of work, the largest number of constructing fi rms opt for the regulation of relations with them through revolving contracts rather than employment ones. Employing a specialist whose skills are specifi c but not rare is an option only when there is a constant need for his/her services and the internalization of his/her services is more cost-eff ective than contracting his/her services.
Unfortunately, for the purpose of research, the relations relying on contracts are much harder to trace. The tracing can be done by accounting forensics, tracing transactions, auditing and other diligence methods applied to every specifi c case, but those methods are unavailable to academic researchers. Therefore, we rely on mainly anecdotal evidence for the support of the commonly accepted idea that construction and civil engineering are a fair representative of the network business model. Here are some arguments we fi nd convincing. First, more than 1000 km of highways have been built in Croatia in the last 15 years. Many Croatian civil engineering fi rms have participated in this big investment cycle. The biggest ones have those that were offi cially given the job on auctions (often as partners in a consortium), whereas the others were included as subcontractors. As a precondition enabling them to bid for a public procurement contract, Croatia obligated the fi rms that off er constructing services on auctions to att ach the list of future subcontractors and submit the evidence so as to prove their joint building capacities. It was also the measure that was aimed at guaranteeing the quality of the services.
The second indication of networking arrangements comes from the fi rms that were included in the building or reconstructing of higher value projects, such as hotels and residential buildings acting as a party to a building contract, but actually having no building capacities (equipment, building workers) of their own. The interviews conducted with several construction engineers from diff erent fi rms in Croatia confi rmed that most work in constructing and civil engineering is done by the joint eff ort of many fi rms, although with typically one or a few of them having a direct contract with the investor.
As can be seen from Table 6 , the ownership perspective used as a weapon for establishing control is more pronounced in the firms belonging to the food and beverages industry and the consequence of it is more complex corporate group 2 structures. If only the top five firms in the industry are taken into consideration (by the number of employees), it becomes obvious that corporate groups are a common pattern of organization. In terms of the number of entities and technological and market differentiation scopes, extensive structures can be observed in most cases in our sample. As an illustration, the average size of the corporate group in the food and beverage industry is 126 in comparison to only 7 in the construction industry (Tables 6 and 7 ).
The three of the fi ve biggest food and beverages companies have subsidiaries at more than one level, but none of the top fi ve in construction.
Thus, it can be concluded that the food and beverage industry is highly consolidated and oligopolistic in its structure. This is consistent with the global trends observed in various studies (Bolotova, Connor & Miller, 2007, 17-33; Fuglie, Heisey, King, Day-Rubenstein, Schimmelpfennig, Wang, Pray Saitone & Sexton, 2012, 2-6) . These industry characteristics are very likely the product of the technologyspecifi c economies of scale and scope, achieved both through large processing technology systems and through the internalization of diff erent production stages (agricultural inputs, processing, distribution, storing, packing, marketing, retailing, etc.) . Again, the Croatian food and beverages industry case is consistent with the global business model, usually applied in the observed industry, which simultaneously allows high productivity levels (Gopinath, Pick & Li, 2003, 1-21) and enables the posing of barriers to new entries with relatively high sunk costs (Paul, 2000, 217-240) , giving the current players more and more market power, which ultimately leads to new acquisitions and higher levels of concentration.
The organizational diff erences noted among the industries relate to the terms of ownership. The business model in the food and beverages manufacturing industry is made up of companies integrated through capital (ownership stakes).The subsidiaries are often geographically spread across the region (mainly in Southeast European countries, as well as in the nearby EU countries, such as Austria, Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic etc.). The networks employed by the construction industry were mostly established as a solution for adapting the capacity to specifi c project requirements. With the government acting as the top investor, political and economic factors exerted a high infl uence on the behavior and performance of the construction industry during the 2005-2013.
CONCLUSION
The observation of the industry acidity rates observed by using the statistical data provided by the National Statistics and Eurostat demonstrate that the construction and the food processing industries reported a drop in their activity, however with one industry suff ering a steeper downturn (the construction). Also, when the construction industry is concerned, the downturn started a year later compared to the food processing industry, but lasted for a longer time.
The comparison of the behavioral and performance patt erns by using another data set, the panel data, confi rmed the diff erences between the demonstrated industry patt erns. According to the panel data, even though industry employment-related trends demonstrate that the sample averages have remained the same, diff erences do appear in the operating revenues and the value of the total assets. The fi gures on the operating revenues are well diversifi ed, whereas the trends regarding the total assets are almost erratic.
Moreover, it is also interesting to note that individual fi rms may show a substantial deviation from the average industry fi gures. This fact was established by looking into more detail at the largest fi ve fi rms in each industry. Somewhat surprisingly, the largest fi rms, at least in the food processing industry, showed almost no infl uence of the crisis on employment, activity levels and performance.
In conclusion, this research has re-confi rmed that the industrial sectors show diff erences in behavior and performance. Exposed to similar macroeconomic circumstances, the two industries have demonstrated diff erent activity patt erns over the same period. Still, the collected evidence revealing that some fi rms were able to circumvent the general declining industry trend is considered to be the main contribution of this research. The analyzed data suggest that the bigger fi rms were able to bett er adjust themselves in the period of the crisis. Also, there are some indications that the business model employed by the largest companies in the sector might have played a role in mitigating falling demand.
Further research will be needed in order to test this theory. One of the main limitations of this research was that it used the panel data and for the most part our observations may be att ributed to accidental errors. Due to the restraints in time and the available data, a potentially more in-depth analysis of the diff erences in organizational models (strategies and the resulting organizational arrangements over a longer period of time) was constrained to a rather small subsample of companies. At this time, we did not explore the possibility of extending this research towards a regression analysis that would att empt to control factors like technology endowment, fi rmlevel market share, ownership stakes etc., leaving out the organizational model to be the dummy variable in the regression. Even if we took this direction, it would still be necessary to defi ne the "organizational model" by using more att ributes than just the number of related business entities and their status in terms of ownership.
ENDNOTES
1
Companies in the food and beverages industry produce intermediate foodstuff s or edible products for human and animal consumption. It does not include the food wholesale, retailing or service sectors (Fuglie et al, 2011 
